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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellants, Thelma Levine ("Levine") and Donald 
Schiffman ("Schiffman") (collectively "Plaintiffs"),1 appeal an 
order of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey dismissing their action without prejudice following the 
court's decision to abstain from considering their federal 
securities claims under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943).  Plaintiffs sought relief under the federal securities 
laws alleging misrepresentations that induced them to purchase 
certain annuities issued by Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company 
("Mutual Benefit" or the "Company"), an insolvent insurance 
company now in rehabilitation proceedings before the New Jersey 
                     
1
.  Plaintiffs are the class representatives for a class 
consisting of all persons, except for the former officers and 
directors of Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company ("Mutual 
Benefit" or the "Company"), who purchased certain annuities, 
which the class alleges were in fact securities subject to the 
federal securities laws, from Mutual Benefit. 
  
Commissioner of Insurance (the "Commissioner" or the 
"Rehabilitator").  The district court permitted the intervention 
of the Commissioner for the limited purpose of filing a motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the 
action pending the outcome of a separate state action commenced 
by the Commissioner in his role as the Rehabilitator of Mutual 
Benefit.  The district court thereafter concluded that 
continuation of Plaintiffs' action at this time would conflict 
with the ongoing state rehabilitation proceedings.  It also 
concluded that Plaintiffs could receive "timely and adequate 
state court review" of all their claims, including the federal 
securities claims, because all of these claims were essentially 
grounded in fraud.  From these premises, the district court 
determined that Burford abstention counseled against continuation 
of Plaintiffs' case at this time and dismissed Plaintiffs' action 
without prejudice subject to possible reconsideration following 
the completion of the Commissioner's rehabilitation efforts. 
 Because federal jurisdiction over one of the claims is 
exclusive and there is an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction over the remaining claims, all of which may belong 
directly to the Plaintiffs, we hold that the district court erred 
when it concluded that there is an opportunity for timely and 
adequate state court review of Plaintiffs' federal securities 
claims.  We will therefore reverse the district court's order 
  
dismissing Plaintiffs' case without prejudice and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
                     
2
.  Judge Ludwig concurs in the result. 
  
 I.  Factual & Procedural History 
 A.  General Background 
 Mutual Benefit was established in 1845.  As of July 
1991, it was one of the country's largest life insurance 
companies, with approximately 700,000 policyholders and 
annuitants and assets approaching $14 billion. 
 Until the late 1970's Mutual Benefit was a relatively 
conservative institution, known as "the Tiffany of the insurance 
industry."  In the late 1970s, and early 1980s, however, Mutual 
Benefit, like other insurance companies, began to expand its 
products beyond the traditional life insurance policy.  It 
marketed and sold a variety of annuity contracts, including 
premium deferred annuities, flexible annuities and guaranteed 
investment contracts.  It began to speculate in high-risk 
ventures and to unduly concentrate its holdings in real estate. 
 This speculation and excessive investment in real 
estate eventually led credit agencies to downgrade Mutual 
Benefit's credit rating.  Thereafter, in the first half of 1991, 
Mutual Benefit's customers withdrew $500 million from the 
Company.  These withdrawals were projected to reach $1 billion by 
the end of the year. 
  
 B.  New Jersey Rehabilitation Proceedings 
 On July 16, 1991, New Jersey's Attorney General, with    
the consent of Mutual Benefit's Board of Directors, asked the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division for Mercer County 
(the "state court") to place Mutual Benefit in rehabilitation 
under the supervision of the Commissioner.  The state court 
granted the request, appointed the Commissioner Rehabilitator of 
Mutual Benefit and vested him with all the powers available under 
New Jersey's version of the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act (the 
"UILA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17B:32-1 to 17B:32-30 (West 1985) 
(repealed 1992).  See In re Rehabilitation of Mutual Benefit Life 
Ins. Co., No. C-91-00109, slip op. at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
July 16, 1991) (the "Rehabilitation Order").3 
 The Rehabilitation Order granted the Commissioner 
exclusive title, possession to, and control over Mutual Benefit's 
assets.  Id. at 4.  It enjoined all persons from interfering in 
any way with the Commissioner in the discharge of his 
rehabilitation duties or in his possession of the property and 
assets of Mutual Benefit, including any causes of action 
                     
3
.  In 1992, while Mutual Benefit's Rehabilitation was ongoing, 
the New Jersey Legislature repealed the UILA and enacted the Life 
& Health Insurers Rehabilitation & Liquidation Act (the "RLA"), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17B:32-31 to 17B:32-91 (West Supp. 1994).  The 
RLA's purpose is "the protection of the interests of insureds, 
claimants, creditors and the public generally" by clarifying the 
law, equitably apportioning any unavoidable losses, and providing 
a comprehensive rehabilitation and liquidation scheme.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 17B:32-31(b) (West Supp. 1994).  The Legislature 
expressly made the RLA applicable to pending rehabilitation 
proceedings.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:32-37. 
  
belonging to the Company.  Specifically, the Rehabilitation Order 
provides that: 
 All officers, directors, policyholders, 
agents, and employees of Mutual Benefit and 
all other persons or entities of any nature, 
including but not limited to claimants, 
holders of annuity contracts, beneficiaries 
under any Mutual Benefit contract, plaintiffs 
or petitioners in any action against Mutual 
Benefit . . . having claims of any nature 
against Mutual Benefit including crossclaims, 
counterclaims and third party claims, are 
hereby enjoined and restrained from: 
 
 * * * 
 
  b. bringing, maintaining or further 
prosecuting any action at law, suit in 
equity, special or other proceeding against 
Mutual Benefit, its estate in receivership or 
against the Commissioner and his successors 
in office, as Rehabilitator thereof . . . ; 
 
  c. making or executing any levy upon 
the property or estate of Mutual Benefit; 
 
 * * * 
 
  e. interfering in any way with the 
Commissioner, or any successors in office, in 
his possession of or title to the property 
and assets of Mutual Benefit, or in the 
discharge of his duties as Rehabilitator 
thereof, pursuant to this Order.  All persons 
or entities of any nature other than the 
Rehabilitator, are hereby restrained from 
commencing any direct or indirect actions 
against any reinsurer of Mutual Benefit for 
proceeds of any reinsurance policies issued 
to . . . or other agreements with, Mutual 
Benefit. 
 
 
Id. at 5-7.  On August 7, 1991, the state court entered an order 
continuing the Commissioner's appointment as Mutual Benefit's 
  
Rehabilitator.  In re Rehabilitation of Mutual Benefit Life Ins. 
Co., No. C-91-00109 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 7, 1991). 
 On March 20, 1992, the state court authorized the 
Commissioner to extend Mutual Benefit's $20 million executive 
liability policy (the "D & O Policy").  Mutual Benefit paid a $1 
million premium in order to extend this policy.  As partial 
consideration for this premium, the extended policy was construed 
to cover actions brought by the Commissioner against the former 
directors and officers of Mutual Benefit despite an exclusion in 
the original policy for actions by one insured against other 
insureds.  In re Rehabilitation of Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 
No. C-91-00109 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 20, 1992) (order 
extending indemnification and reconsidering the decision denying 
extension of insurance). 
 In late 1991, the Commissioner's financial analysis of 
Mutual Benefit showed that, as of June 30, 1991, the Company's 
assets had a going concern value that was only about 88% of its 
liabilities.4  The Commissioner's report estimated the 
liquidation value of the Company, on a six month basis, at 55% of 
its liabilities. 
 On August 3, 1992, the Commissioner submitted a Plan of 
Rehabilitation to the state court.  This plan (the 
"Rehabilitation Plan") guarantees full death, disability and 
                     
4
.  The Commissioner's report indicated that Mutual Benefit then 
had liabilities of $9.9 billion and $8.8 billion in assets.  His 
valuation of Mutual Benefit's assets assumed that it would remain 
a going concern and would hold its assets for an average of five 
to ten years. 
  
retirement benefits and restructures permanent life policies and 
other contracts into non-participating universal contracts with 
minimum guaranteed interest rates.  The Rehabilitation Plan also 
restricts withdrawals during a rehabilitation period ending 
December 31, 1999.  In re Rehabilitation of Mutual Benefit Life 
Ins. Co., No. C-91-00109, slip op. at 23-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. Aug. 12, 1993). 
 Under the Rehabilitation Plan, policyholders would 
recover 88% of the present value of their July 1991 account 
balances.  The Plan provides an alternative opt out provision 
entitling policyholders to immediate payment of 55% of the value 
of their original account. 
 The state court held hearings on the Rehabilitation 
Plan over a four month period beginning in January 1993.  The 
court's opinion, issued August 12, 1993, affirms the 
Rehabilitation Plan in most respects.  Appeals from that order 
have been filed in state court. 
 During the rehabilitation process, the Commissioner 
investigated the causes of Mutual Benefit's collapse.  On July 8, 
1993, the Commissioner filed a complaint in the state court on 
behalf of "Mutual Benefit, its policyholders, creditors and other 
interested parties" against thirty-eight named defendants, 
including many of the officers and directors who managed the 
Company from 1979 through 1991, Appellants' Appendix ("App.") at 
449, and the Company's outside accountants, Ernst & Young.  The 
complaint alleges theories of recovery based on negligence, 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, waste and violations of New 
  
Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-48 
(West 1989 & Supp. 1994).  In the state court action, the 
Commissioner seeks to recover damages for the benefit of Mutual 
Benefit's estate and "to recover, particularly for the benefit of 
Mutual Benefit's policyholders who have priority in the 
distribution of Mutual Benefit's assets, damages . . . which have 
resulted in loss to the Company and diminution in the value of 
the insurance policies and other investments held by some 700,000 
policyholders and annuitants."  App. at 449. 
 The Commissioner's complaint alleges that the former 
directors and officers of Mutual Benefit mismanaged the Company 
by investing too much of the Company's assets in real estate, 
particularly high risk real estate projects, and by investing in 
leveraged buy-outs.  The complaint also alleges that the 
directors and officers made material misrepresentations to Mutual 
Benefit's policyholders and annuitants regarding the financial 
condition of the Company. 
 
 C.  New Jersey State Class Actions 
 On July 17, 1991, one day after the state court placed 
Mutual Benefit in rehabilitation, the first of six state class 
actions was filed.  The other five class actions were filed 
within the week, and the state court eventually consolidated all 
six into one action. 
 The state class action complaints are similar to the 
Commissioner's complaint.  They allege excessive investment in 
high-risk, non-performing real estate ventures and leveraged  
  
buy-outs, as well as public misrepresentations concerning Mutual 
Benefit's financial condition.  They assert claims for fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
negligence. 
 The various plaintiffs in the state class actions moved 
for class certification.  The Commissioner opposed class 
certification and sought dismissal of the action on the ground 
that the Commissioner had standing to bring the claims asserted 
therein and that continuation of the class action suits would 
impede the rehabilitation effort. 
 The state court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class 
certification in the state actions without prejudice holding that 
the Commissioner had a prior right to pursue these claims and 
satisfy them out of the $20 million D & O Policy.  The state 
court stayed the class actions and ruled that after the 
Commissioner's action was concluded, a Rehabilitation Plan 
approved, and all appeals exhausted, it would decide whether 
plaintiffs had been made whole and whether their actions should 
proceed as a class action, if at all.  In re Mutual Benefit Life 
Policyholders Action Litigation, No. L-91-5318, slip op. at 2 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1993).  The state court permitted 
discovery to proceed only to the extent plaintiffs' efforts 
"[did] not require any input from the rehabilitation estate and 
[did] not interfere with the prior orders of the Court in the 
rehabilitation action."  Id. at 3.  In orders dated January 25, 
1993, and June 8, 1993, respectively, the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court 
  
denied the plaintiffs' motions for leave to appeal the lower 
court's decision. 
 
 D.  The Present Case 
 On August 15, 1991, Plaintiffs5 filed this federal 
class action suit on behalf of themselves, and all others 
similarly situated, against a number of officers and directors of 
Mutual Benefit in the district court.  These same officers and 
directors are the defendants in the Commissioner's state court 
suit, as well as the state court class actions. 
 The Plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of 
all purchasers of Mutual Benefit annuities between August 14, 
1988 and July 15, 1991.  Approximately 200,000 individuals fall 
into this category.  Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the 
various directors and officers joined as defendants:  (1) 
violated sections 5 and 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 
"Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77e, 77e(1) (West 1981), by 
failing to register Mutual Benefit's annuity products with the 
SEC as securities; (2) made materially false or misleading 
statements in the prospectuses issued in connection with the 
annuities in violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 77e(2) (West 1981); (3) were liable as controlling 
persons of Mutual Benefit under section 15 of the Securities Act, 
                     
5
.  The record shows that Levine and Charles Riley initially 
filed this suit.  Schiffman subsequently filed a suit which the 
district court consolidated with the Levine/Riley suit.  Riley is 
not named as a plaintiff in the amended complaint filed after 
consolidation of the two cases.  
  
15 U.S.C.A. § 77o (West 1981); (4) made materially false and 
misleading statements about the financial strength of Mutual 
Benefit thereby inducing Plaintiffs to purchase the annuities in 
violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the "Securities Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 
1981); and (5) violated New Jersey Statutory and common law, 
including the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-48 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).  The Plaintiffs 
alleged that Mutual Benefit compiled a real estate portfolio that 
lacked adequate diversification; that Mutual Benefit's overall 
portfolio had a substantial concentration in real estate; and 
that Mutual Benefit made improper investments. 
 On August 6, 1993, the officers and directors named as 
defendants in this action moved to dismiss the complaint because 
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, and they had failed to 
assert their fraud claims with the particularity required.  The 
officers and directors also moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
basis of the Burford abstention doctrine or, alternatively, to 
stay the action until the Commissioner's action is concluded.  On 
August 20, 1993, the Commissioner moved to intervene in this 
action, and to join the officers' and directors' motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on abstention grounds or to enter a 
stay until the conclusion of the state proceedings. 
  
 On December 13, 1993, the district court granted the 
Commissioner's motion to intervene6 and dismissed the complaint, 
without prejudice on the basis of Burford abstention.  See Riley 
v. Simmons, 839 F. Supp. 1113 (D.N.J. 1993).  This timely appeal 
followed. 
 
 II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 We review the district court's decision to abstain for 
abuse of discretion, but the district court's analysis of the law 
on abstention is subject to de novo review.  Thus: 
 "A district court has little or no discretion 
to abstain in a case that does not meet 
traditional abstention requirements.  Within 
these constraints, determination whether the 
exceptional circumstances required for 
abstention exist is left to the district 
court, and will be set aside on review only 
if the district court has abused its 
discretion." 
 
 
Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953, 
957-58 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United Serv. Auto Ass'n v. Muir, 
792 F.2d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 
(1987)). 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 22 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 77v(a), and section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78aa.  Section 27 grants the federal courts "exclusive 
                     
6
.  Plaintiffs appeal only the district court's decision to 
abstain, not its decision to permit the Commissioner to intervene 
in the federal court action. 
  
jurisdiction" over any violation arising under the Securities 
Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa.  In the order which the 
Plaintiffs appeal the district court said:  "This Court will 
dismiss the action without prejudice as Burford abstention is 
appropriate."  Riley, 839 F. Supp. at 1129.  This phrasing raises 
a question concerning our appellate jurisdiction.  We have a duty 
to inquire independently into our own jurisdiction. 
 Under Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), a district court order which 
dismisses a complaint without prejudice is generally not 
considered a final appealable order.  It is final and appealable, 
however, if the plaintiff cannot amend the complaint to remove 
the ground of dismissal.  Borelli, 532 F.2d at 952 (citations 
omitted).  The district court's decision to abstain under Burford 
leaves the Plaintiffs unable to amend the complaint to remove the 
reason for the district court's dismissal.  Moreover, a decision 
to abstain is necessarily "without prejudice" because it always 
prevents the court from proceeding to the merits.  Thus, Borelli 
does not apply to this case. 
 In Baltimore Bank for Cooperatives v. Farmers Cheese 
Cooperative, 583 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1978), we considered our 
appellate jurisdiction over a district court order staying an 
action on the basis of Burford abstention.  We noted first that 
the proper disposition of a case to which Burford abstention 
applies is a "'dismissal of the action, rather than retention of 
jurisdiction pending a state determination . . . .'"  Id. at 108 
(citing Charles Wright, Federal Courts § 52, at 200 (1970)); see 
  
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 12.3, at 612 
(1989) ("Burford abstention--abstention out of deference to 
centralized state administrative proceedings--requires the 
federal court to dismiss the case.").  We then went on to state: 
 But the technical failure to dismiss should 
not render an ordinarily final disposition of 
the case on the basis of abstention 
unappealable.  Drexler v. Southwest Dubois 
School Corp., 504 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 
1974) (en banc).  Such an abstention order is 
for all intents and purposes a final 
disposition of the case within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and is therefore appealable.  
Indiana State Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. 
Boehning, 511 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 
 
Id. at 108-09.  We explained our Baltimore Bank holding on 
appellate jurisdiction in Richman Brothers Records, Inc. v. U.S. 
Sprint Communications Co., 953 F.2d 1431 (3d Cir. 1991).  There 
we stated: 
  The teachings of Farmers Cheese are 
two-fold: administrative abstention orders, 
which completely relinquish federal 
jurisdiction by giving way to state 
administrative agencies, are final decisions 
appealable under section 1291; orders 
transferring discrete issues involving 
regulatory expertise under the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction, by giving way to a 
federal administrative agency, are not final 
decisions appealable under section 1291. 
 
 
Richman Bros. Records, Inc., 953 F.2d at 1442.  We opined: 
"Generally, when a federal court abstains in deference to a state 
court or regulatory agency, the abstention necessarily ends the 
federal court's involvement with the suit."  Id. at 1443; see 
also Chemerinsky, § 12.3, at 612 ("The effect of Burford 
  
abstention is thus not to postpone federal court review but to 
prevent it entirely."). 
 Finally, in Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 
678 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that, "where [a] dismissal of an 
appeal will have the practical effect of denying later appellate 
review of a district court's underlying order, the underlying 
order must be final, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."  In 
this case, if we were to determine that we lacked appellate 
jurisdiction, we would effectively render the district court's 
decision to abstain unreviewable.  Our rationale in Baltimore 
Bank, Richman Brothers Records, Inc., and Carr demonstrates the 
finality of the district court's order.  Accordingly we have 
appellate jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 
(West 1993). 
 
 III.  Analysis 
 Federal courts have an obligation to exercise their 
jurisdiction.  Abstention, therefore, is the exception rather 
than the rule.  See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
229, 236 (1984); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).  Moreover, Burford 
abstention has particular relevance to claims arising in the 
course of state regulation of insolvent insurance companies.  See 
Grode, 8 F.3d at 958; Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American 
Home Assurance Co., 864 F.2d 1033, 1045 (3d Cir. 1988) ("LAQ"); 
cf. University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 
270-71 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) (assuming for purposes of case that 
  
state regulation of insurance companies can provide the relevant 
"complex regulatory scheme" or "coherent policy with respect to a 
matter of substantial public concern" that are Burford 
prerequisites).  Recognizing these principles, we examine the 
district court's decision to apply Burford abstention to 
Plaintiffs' claims, including their federal securities claims, 
and to dismiss this action. 
 The Supreme Court has summarized Burford's underlying 
principles as follows: 
 Where timely and adequate state-court review 
is available, a federal court sitting in 
equity must decline to interfere with the 
proceedings or orders of state administrative 
agencies:  (1) when there are "difficult 
questions of state law bearing on policy 
problems of substantial public import whose 
importance transcends the result in the case 
then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of 
federal review of the question in a case and 
in similar cases would be disruptive of state 
efforts to establish a coherent policy with 
respect to a matter of substantial public 
concern." 
 
 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 
350, 361 (1989) ("NOPSI") (quoting Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814).  The principles just 
quoted, however, fail to tell the whole story.  In NOPSI, the 
Supreme Court also teaches us that Burford abstention calls for a 
two-step analysis.  The first question is whether "timely and 
adequate state-court review" is available.  Id.  Only if a 
district court determines that such review is available, should 
it turn to the other issues and determine if the case before it 
  
involves difficult questions of state law impacting on the 
state's public policy or whether the district court's exercise of 
jurisdiction would have a disruptive effect on the state's 
efforts to establish a coherent public policy on a matter of 
important state concern. 
 In this case, the district court emphasized the 
disruptive effect that the continuation of the federal action 
would have on the parallel state rehabilitation proceedings.  In 
considering whether Plaintiffs had an opportunity for "timely and 
adequate state court review" of their federal securities claims, 
the district court equated them with the common law fraud claims 
the Commissioner was pursuing in his state action.  It then 
reasoned:  "This is not a case where plaintiffs' federal claims 
give them an independent or separate remedy" and so concluded 
that the state court action provided "'timely and adequate' state 
court review. . . ."  Riley, 839 F. Supp. at 1127. 
 Plaintiffs first contend that Burford abstention is 
available only in cases invoking equitable remedies and that 
their request for class certification and a declaratory judgment 
is not primarily addressed to what used to be the equity side of 
the court.  Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's legal 
premise conflating the federal securities claims with the state 
common law fraud claims.  They argue that the district court 
erred in concluding that "timely and adequate state court review" 
of their federal securities claims is available and, accordingly, 
that the district court's order dismissing their action without 
prejudice should be reversed.  In the alternative, Plaintiffs 
  
argue that the district court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that the continuation of the federal securities action 
would exert a disruptive effect on the state rehabilitation 
proceedings and interfere with the state's attempt to establish a 
coherent policy relating to the regulation of insolvent insurance 
companies. 
 Preliminarily, we consider Plaintiffs' argument that 
the district court erred in invoking Burford abstention in a case 
in which the primary remedy they seek is money damages.  We are 
referred again to NOPSI and our own decision in University of 
Maryland.  In NOPSI, the Supreme Court did indeed state that "a 
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with" 
state court proceedings where Burford abstention requirements are 
met.  See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added).  In Baltimore 
Bank, this Court stated: 
 Burford, as we have already indicated, was an 
equitable action. . . .  The instant 
litigation to recover a debt is a legal 
action.  Traditionally, abstention has been 
applied only in cases involving equitable 
relief.  The district court, 
however, . . . impermissibly extended 
abstention to a common law action. 
 
 
Baltimore Bank, 583 F.2d at 111 (citation omitted).  In 
University of Maryland, we said that Baltimore Bank was still 
good law in this Circuit.  University of Maryland, 923 F.2d at 
271. 
 Plaintiffs therefore argue that Burford abstention is 
inappropriate given this Court's statements in University of 
  
Maryland and Baltimore Bank.  The officers and directors of 
Mutual Benefit, along with the Commissioner, contend that 
Plaintiffs are really seeking rescission, an equitable remedy, 
and Burford abstention is not precluded even if it remains 
available only in cases that stand in equity.7 
                     
7
.  Although this panel is bound by the earlier holdings of this 
Court under Internal Operating Procedure 9.1, see Hammond v. 
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of Am., 27 F.3d 52, 57 (3d Cir. 1994)  
(In re Hammond), the comments in this footnote relating to 
Burford abstention in non-equity cases are the opinion of the 
opinion writer, not the Court.  For a contrary view, see Nygaard, 
J., concurring.  In my opinion, it is not at all clear whether 
the statement in Baltimore Bank restricting Burford abstention to 
equity is a holding that survives as the law relating to Burford 
abstention has developed or that the Supreme Court's reference in 
NOPSI to equity and our reference to it in University of Maryland 
and Baltimore Bank are anything but dicta.  Furthermore, 
substantial confusion continues as to when an action brought 
under the federal system's unification of law and equity is 
primarily equitable.  Considering these uncertainties, I would be 
inclined to follow the lead of another panel of this Court faced 
with the same issue.  It decided: 
 
 Decisional authority remains inconclusive as 
to whether Burford abstention may be ordered 
only in cases of an equitable nature, or 
whether, as [we stated in LAQ], the 
distinction between legal and equitable 
relief is not dispositive in abstention 
cases.  Hence, we are hesitant to sustain [a] 
claim that the district court's abstention 
order should be reversed, relying solely on 
the ground that [Plaintiffs'] seek[] money 
damages, rather than either declaratory or 
injunctive relief. 
 
General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Medical Found., 973 F.2d 
197, 202 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).  The Baltimore Bank 
issue concerning Burford's restriction to suits in equity was not 
initially addressed by the parties, but the Court asked for and 
received supplemental briefing on it.  This strengthens my 
reluctance to decide the case on the ground that Burford 
abstention is limited to cases primarily equitable in nature.  My 
conclusion that Burford abstention does not apply to this case 
for other reasons makes it unnecessary for me to delve into 
  
 In this case, however, we believe the key to Burford 
abstention is whether the Plaintiffs have an opportunity for 
"timely and adequate state court review" of their claims.  Where 
a state court lacks jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim, 
Burford abstention is clearly inappropriate because there can be 
no opportunity for "timely and adequate state court review" of a 
claim that a court has no power to decide.  See University of 
Maryland, 923 F.2d at 274 (abstention is inappropriate because it 
would deprive plaintiffs "of a forum and of all recourse to have 
their claims heard on the merits"). 
 Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act gives federal 
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under 
that Act.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa.8  In Evans v. Dale, 896 F.2d 
975 (5th Cir. 1990), the court of appeals reversed a district 
court order, which dismissed on Burford principles security 
(..continued) 
issues involving arcane distinctions between law and equity and 
their continuing relevance to abstention doctrine.  I note, 
however, that section 12(1) or section 12(2) claims under the 
Securities Act may be brought in either law or equity.  See 
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation §§ 7.2, 7.5, 
at 276, 301 (2d ed. 1990); see also infra note 11 (discussing 
rescissionary nature of section 12 of the Security Act).   
8
.  Section 27 provides: 
 
 The district courts of the United 
States . . . shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or 
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of 
all suits in equity and actions at law 
brought to enforce any liability of duty 
created by this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder. 
 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (emphasis added). 
  
claims arising in the course of a domestic relations dispute.  
Evans brought a federal suit, which was ancillary to her divorce 
action against her husband Dale, seeking recovery under federal 
securities law for misrepresentations Dale had made about 
corporate stock during a state court proceeding for division of 
property.  Evans, 896 F.2d at 976-77.  The district court relied 
on Burford, heavily emphasizing the reluctance of federal courts 
to intervene in issues of state domestic relations law.  The 
court of appeals held that abstention was inappropriate because 
the plaintiff's federal securities claims were subject to 
exclusive federal jurisdiction and so could not be considered in 
any state court.  Id. at 978-79; see also Finkielstain v. Seidel, 
857 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding Burford abstention 
inapplicable to action seeking relief for alleged violations of 
the Securities Exchange Act within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal courts). 
 The Securities Exchange Act gives federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5 claim and 
necessarily deprives New Jersey state courts of jurisdiction over 
that claim.9  Like the courts in Evans and Finkielstain, we will 
                     
9
.  Rule 10b-5 implements section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act.  It provides: 
 
  It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange,  
 
   (a) To employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 
  
reverse the district court's decision to abstain on Burford 
principles because there is no possibility of "timely and 
adequate state court review" of Plaintiffs' Rule 10b(5) claim, 
which Congress has chosen to commit exclusively to the federal 
courts.10 
 The district court concluded that all of Plaintiffs' 
claims would receive "timely and adequate state court review" 
because Plaintiffs' security claims were essentially the 
equivalent of the common law fraud claims being pursued by the 
Commissioner in the state court action.  The district court 
stated:  "No further relief can be obtained by asserting the 
(..continued) 
   (b) To make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
 
   (c) To engage in any act,  
practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, 
 
 in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). 
10
.  Considering the impact such actions may have on procedures 
for the rehabilitation or orderly liquidation of insolvent 
insurance companies, which Congress has entrusted exclusively to 
the states, see 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011, 1012 (West 1976), and the 
crushing impact that an insurance company's inability to pay the 
claims of its insureds and other creditors may have, one could 
wonder about the wisdom of this doctrine, but we believe it is 
beyond this panel's power to change it. 
  
section 10(b)-5 claim vis-a-vis the Rehabilitator's state court 
common law fraud claim."  Riley, 839 F. Supp. at 1127. 
 It is clear, however, that Rule 10b-5 establishes a 
cause of action distinct from one for common law fraud.  See, 
e.g., Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies & Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 750, 757, 760-61 (1992).  Indeed, the legislative history of 
the Securities Exchange Act and its text show that Congress 
concluded that the common law remedies of deceit, fraud and 
misrepresentation were inadequate and unfair to the average 
investor.  Consequently it made significant changes in the means 
by which liability for those common law torts could be 
established.  The district court's reliance on the surface 
similarity of the Rule 10b-5 remedy to common law remedies for 
fraud and misrepresentation highlights the district court's 
failure to consider all of Plaintiffs' securities claims, 
particularly those based on sections 5 and 12(1) of the 
Securities Act.  Section 5 of the Securities Act requires a 
seller of securities to file a registration statement before 
offering a security for sale unless the securities offered come 
within statutorily defined exemptions.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e.  
Section 12(1) provides that a purchaser of a security that is not 
registered in accord with section 5 has a civil action for 
damages against the seller of the security.  Id. § 77l(1).11  
                     
11
.  Section 12(1) is essentially a rescissionary remedy.  It 
provides that the person who sells the security is liable to the 
purchaser for: 
 
 the consideration paid for such security with 
interest thereon, less the amount of any 
  
This cause of action and the remedy it affords are clearly 
different from common law actions. 
 In reaching its determination that Plaintiffs had an 
opportunity for "timely and adequate state court review" of their 
claims, the district court may have also conflated any injury the 
putative common law fraud of the officers and directors caused 
the purchasers of the variable annuities with any injury that 
fraud caused Mutual Benefit and all of its policyholders to 
suffer.12  We have held that Burford abstention is inappropriate 
where a plaintiff asserts "claims which are broader than, and 
different from, the Commissioner's. . . ."  General Glass, 973 
F.2d at 204.  We have also acknowledged that individual 
stockholders may have a distinct and independent cause of action 
(..continued) 
income received thereon, upon the tender of 
such security, or for damages if he no longer 
owns the security.   
 
15 U.S.C.A. § 77l(1).  Similarly, Plaintiffs' remedy under 
section 12(2) of the Securities Act is essentially a remedy of 
rescission.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77l(2).  That section provides a 
remedy for material misstatements or omissions made in connection 
with the sale or offer for sale of a security.   
12
.  We use the subjunctive "may have" because any difference 
between the injury the purchasers of these annuities suffered and 
the injuries the company or its policyholders face depends on 
whether the annuities are securities subject to federal 
securities law or a type of insurance policy subject to state 
insurance law.  That question, which involves the merits of the 
Plaintiffs' federal and state claims, is yet to be answered.  If  
it is answered in the negative, there would then appear to be an 
adequate opportunity for review of the remaining common law 
claims in the courts of New Jersey, in which case the district 
court would have to consider whether it should decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1367(c)(3) over the Plaintiffs' common law claims. 
  
from that of the corporation or other stockholders premised on 
misrepresentations by officers and directors of a corporation.  
Hayes v. Gross, 982 F.2d 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A]n 
individual stockholder may sue officers and directors based on an 
injury distinct from the injury to the corporation and the 
indirect injury to stockholders generally.").  Plaintiffs' 
federal securities claims, like their common law claims, arise 
out of the direct losses they suffered as a result of purchases 
of annuities by Plaintiffs and other persons similarly situated 
to Plaintiffs.  Their claim is for losses they directly suffered, 
not as stockholders derivatively injured by the directors' or 
officers' failure to meet their fiduciary duties to the 
corporation.  The district court erred when it concluded that 
Plaintiffs' federal securities claims were the same as those 
being pursued by the Commissioner in the state action.13  We hold 
that Plaintiffs' claims, if they turn out to be viable federal 
securities claims, are distinct from those the Commissioner now 
presses in the pending state action.14  Therefore, if the 
                     
13
.  Similar analysis might demonstrate that Plaintiffs' fraud 
claims under both New Jersey common law and the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act are personal to Plaintiffs.  Thus, on remand 
if the federal claims survive on the merits, the district court 
may also have to determine whether Plaintiffs' state law cause of 
action for fraud encompasses an injury distinct from any injury 
suffered by Mutual Benefit. 
14
.  The district court's opinion indicates that the Commissioner 
was permitted to intervene for the limited purpose of arguing in 
favor of Burford abstention.  A closer look at its opinion, 
however, indicates it also concluded that the Commissioner would 
have standing to prosecute the Plaintiffs' federal securities 
claims under New Jersey law.  See Riley, 839 F. Supp. at 1127.  
In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on N.J. 
  
annuities Plaintiffs bought are securities, they cannot receive 
timely and adequate state court review as required by Burford. 
 We do not rely entirely on any general proposition that 
"[a]bstention is also inappropriate . . . [where] a federal issue 
is involved which [gives] the district court independent federal 
jurisdiction."  Grode, 8 F.3d at 960.  Taken in its most 
expansive sense, that proposition would preclude abstention no 
matter how important the state interest or how severe the federal 
interference with the state's scheme for resolution of problems 
Congress has seen fit to entrust to the states.  Nevertheless, 
(..continued) 
Stat. Ann. § 17B:32-50(a)(15) and In re Integrity Insurance Co., 
573 A.2d 928 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1990).  The parties have not 
argued the propriety of the district court's intervention 
decision on this appeal and therefore we are unwilling to 
consider that issue.  We note, however, statements in In re 
Integrity Insurance Co. indicating that the Commissioner only has 
standing to pursue derivative, as opposed to direct, claims of 
creditors and policyholders.  See In re Integrity Insurance Co., 
573 A.2d at 935 (distinguishing between claims "on behalf of" 
creditors and policyholders and claims "belonging to" creditors 
and policyholders).  As explained, Plaintiffs' claims seem to be 
direct claims that are personal in nature at least to the extent 
that they seek damages under the federal securities laws.   
 
    Section 17B:32-50(a)(15) gives the Commissioner the power to 
prosecute actions on "behalf of" policyholders as opposed to 
those "belonging to" policyholders.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 17B:32-50(a)(15) (West Supp. 1994).  The statute expressly 
gives the Commissioner standing to pursue such actions when he 
acts in liquidation proceedings.  It does not mention 
rehabilitation proceedings.  Compare N.J. Stat. Ann §§ 17B:32-41, 
17B:32-42 (providing grounds under which Commissioner may 
petition state court to place insurance company in rehabilitation 
proceedings) and id. § 17B:32-42 (providing that Commissioner 
shall be appointed rehabilitator and outlining responsibilities 
of Commissioner in rehabilitation capacity) with id. §§ 17B:32-
45, 17B:32-50 (providing grounds under which Commissioner may 
petition state court to place insurance company in liquidation). 
  
the circumstances present in this case, in which the district 
court may ultimately decide that the annuities Plaintiffs 
purchased are not securities offered in violation of federal 
securities law, should lead the district court to proceed 
cautiously. 
 We recognize the Commissioner's argument that 
Plaintiffs, by pursuing this action, can put themselves in a 
position superior to Mutual Benefit's other policyholders and 
claimants who are wholly dependent on the rehabilitation 
proceedings.  There is some force to the Commissioner's 
contention that allowing this action to continue is likely to 
interfere with the process of marshalling the assets of Mutual 
Benefit and equitably distributing them among all persons who 
hold claims against the Company.  In this respect, both the 
Commissioner and the district court focus on the $20 million fund 
the D & O Policy created.  They contend that Plaintiffs' action 
may remove from Mutual Benefit's estate funds needed for 
equitable apportionment among the claims asserted in the state 
rehabilitation proceedings.  The Commissioner asserts in his 
brief:  "Any judgment for [Plaintiffs] would wipe out the limits 
of the $20 million D & O Policy, and would leave the Commissioner 
without insurance coverage for the claims of the other 500,000 
policyholders not represented by Plaintiffs' proposed class."  
Brief for Intervenor/Appellee at 37.  He thus concludes that 
Plaintiffs' ability to proceed in a federal forum promotes a race 
to the courthouse that can detrimentally affect Mutual Benefit 
and its other policyholders. 
  
 The officers and directors, as defendants, join this 
argument, adding their voices to a chorus raising the inequity 
that may result from allowing Plaintiffs to compete in a race for 
collection of the D & O Policy's limited fund after the 
Commissioner has already spent $1 million of Mutual Benefit's 
dollars to ensure that the proceeds of this policy would be 
available to its estate.  Both the Commissioner and the 
defendants also argue that continuation of this action, no matter 
what its outcome, will diminish the funds available to Mutual 
Benefit and its policyholders because the D & O Policy limits 
will be reduced under policy provisions for their use in paying 
defendants' legal fees. 
 We, like the district court, are troubled by diversion 
of funds from Mutual Benefit and its policyholders to the cost of 
litigation that benefits only one class of persons injured by the 
acts of the Company's officers and directors.  A remedy for that 
problem, however, is beyond the power of this panel under 
existing statutory law and what we believe is binding Supreme 
Court precedent and circuit procedure.  Governing case law seems 
to us to make it clear that mere interference with the 
Commissioner's ability to marshall the Company's assets cannot 
justify Burford abstention over claims exclusively subject to 
federal jurisdiction. 
 Moreover, if the D & O Policy is an essential source of 
estate funds, this case appears analogous to Hayes v. Gross, 
where this Court rejected a similar argument when it was advanced 
by the Resolution Trust Company (the "RTC").  In Hayes, the 
  
plaintiff was a purchaser of the stock of a failed savings 
association and sought to recover damages from officers and 
directors of the association for violations of the federal 
securities laws.  Hayes, 982 F.2d at 105.  While the savings 
association was in receivership RTC asked to have the action 
dismissed, arguing that the claim arose out of various officers' 
and directors' mismanagement of the savings association, and that 
it was therefore a derivative, as opposed to a direct claim.  Id.  
RTC also argued that continuation of the action would impair its 
ability to comply with its statutory mandate to maximize the 
assets of the savings association.  Id. at 109. 
 We considered whether the continuation of plaintiff's 
case affected RTC's prosecution of a mismanagement suit on behalf 
of the savings association against the officers and directors.  
We stated: 
 Allowing plaintiff to pursue this claim will 
neither prejudice the corporation and its 
other stockholders nor permit a double 
recovery for the same injury.  If [the 
savings association] has claims against its 
officers and directors arising from their 
mismanagement, the RTC is free to pursue 
those claims for the ultimate benefit of the 
creditors and stockholders of [the savings 
association].  Assuming solvency on the part 
of the defendants, as we must on this record, 
we see no conflict between plaintiff's 
interest and those of the creditors and other 
stockholders.  Assuming insolvency on the 
part of the defendants, a conflict between 
plaintiff and [the savings association], as 
creditors of the defendants, may arise, but 
the RTC has advanced no persuasive reason 
why, in such circumstances, plaintiff and 
[the savings association] should not be 
treated as any other creditors competing for 
a limited pool of resources. 
  
 
  As far as the potential for double 
recovery is concerned, plaintiff has alleged 
that the market price of [the savings 
association's] stock when he purchased it was 
far in excess of what it would have been had 
the market been evaluating the failing 
institution that defendants knew [it] to be.  
Plaintiff will have to prove this allegation.  
When he attempts to do so, it may be that he 
will attempt to recover compensation to which 
the corporation is justly entitled.  If so, 
the district court will be required to 
evaluate the prospect of double recovery in 
the specific fact context presented by 
plaintiff's case on damages.  It will suffice 
for present purposes to conclude, as we do, 
that double recovery is not inherent in 
plaintiff's theory of the case and, 
accordingly, that recovery without 
duplication is possible. 
 
 
Id. at 108-109 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).  
Specifically, we also noted, that "[i]f both plaintiff and the 
RTC prove[d] entitled to judgment, there [would] be no inequity 
in requiring defendants to satisfy both judgments."  Id. at 109. 
 The assumption of ultimate solvency may be quite 
optimistic, but in this case, as in Hayes, we are constrained to 
act within the record and this record does not show that the 
D & O Policy is essential to the rehabilitation of Mutual 
Benefit.  We see nothing on the face of this record that supports 
the Commissioner's conclusion that the D & O Policy is the only 
asset available for satisfaction of a judgment against the 
various officers and directors who are defendants.  Similarly, in 
University of Maryland, we rejected this argument when it was 
advanced in support of Burford abstention.  There, concluding 
  
that the policyholders' claims were direct, as opposed to 
derivative, we held that Burford abstention was inappropriate. 
 Hayes, and University of Maryland, compel this panel to 
hold that it is inappropriate to dismiss a plaintiff's action 
solely because collection of a judgment, if obtained, might 
reduce the assets of an insolvent insurance company's estate.15  
The Commissioner's argument may support a conclusion that 
continuation of the federal action is likely to disrupt "'state 
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter 
of substantial public concern,'" but as we have stated throughout 
this opinion this is insufficient to justify Burford abstention 
when there is no opportunity for "timely and adequate state court 
                     
15
.  This principle was acknowledged by The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in rejecting the application of 
Burford abstention to plaintiff's claims in Evans v. Dale: 
 
 By deciding the federal securities fraud 
issues asserted here, the district court will 
not usurp any part of Texas domestic 
relations law.  It is true that the outcome 
of the exclusively federal issue may affect 
the relative value of property distributions 
which will be made by the Texas court and may 
even require a redistribution of that 
property.  However, the decision regarding 
distribution or redistribution under Texas 
domestic relations law will remain entirely 
within the authority of the Texas court.  If 
the district court orders disgorgement of the 
profits made by Dale in stock transactions 
subsequent to the divorce or takes other 
remedial action allowed by the federal 
securities laws, it will do so under its 
exclusive jurisdiction vested pursuant to 
those laws. 
Evans, 896 F.2d at 979. 
  
review" of Plaintiffs' claims.  NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 261 (quoting 
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814). 
  Plaintiffs' claims in this case, like those in Hayes 
and University of Maryland, appear to be direct claims for their 
own injuries.  Their federal security claims are substantially 
different than, and distinct from, the claims advanced by the 
Commissioner in the state action.  To the extent that Plaintiffs 
have asserted valid securities claims,16 it seems clear to us 
that those claims are direct, rather than derivative.  As we have 
already noted, however, the problem created by the lack of an 
opportunity for state court review would be eliminated if 
Plaintiffs' annuities are not "securities" under federal law.  
Moreover, if Plaintiffs do recover under the federal securities 
laws, they should no longer be entitled to share in the funds of 
the Company, including any funds realized from the Commissioner's 
action against the directors and officers in state court.  
Therefore, as we noted in Hayes, it would be appropriate for the 
district court, in determining damages, to adjust the Plaintiffs' 
remedy in this action to account for any potential for double 
recovery in the state rehabilitation proceeding.  See Hayes, 982 
F.2d at 109. 
 
 IV. 
                     
16
.  As we have previously noted, the district court did not 
reach the merits of Plaintiffs' securities claims, nor do we.  
See supra notes 12 and 13. 
  
 In conclusion, we hold that Burford abstention is 
precluded when a state court has no jurisdiction over a 
plaintiff's direct as opposed to derivative claims.  When a 
plaintiff presses a direct claim within the jurisdiction of a  
federal court, there is no basis for Burford abstention, if the 
plaintiff cannot receive timely or adequate state court review of 
the claim.  Here, it is clear that Plaintiffs' 10b-5 claim falls 
exclusively within the province of the federal courts.  Moreover, 
as to their claims under sections 5, 12(1), 12(2), and 15 of the 
Securities Act, it is equally apparent that there is no 
opportunity for timely state court review, as these claims are 
personal to the Plaintiffs.  Because the district court erred 
when it conflated Plaintiffs' federal securities claims with the 
common law fraud claims of the Commissioner, and in concluding 
that Plaintiffs had an opportunity for timely and adequate state 
court review of their claims, we will reverse the district 
court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' claims under the Burford 
abstention doctrine, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
Riley v. Simmons, No. 94-5055 
 
 
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 I agree with the opinion of the court that the district 
court erred when it applied Burford abstention.  I also believe, 
alternatively, that Burford abstention is simply not available 
when legal, rather than equitable or declaratory, relief is 
sought.   
 In Baltimore Bank for Coops. v. Farmers Cheese Coop., 
583 F.2d 104, 111 (3d Cir. 1978), a bank filed a diversity action 
seeking monetary recovery for milk it had sold and delivered to 
the defendant.  The district court abstained under Burford, but 
we reversed, holding that Burford abstention is not available in 
legal, common law actions.  We stated: 
 Burford . . . was an equitable action to 
restrain the Texas Railroad Commission.  The 
instant litigation to recover a debt is a 
legal action.  Traditionally, abstention has 
been applied only in cases involving 
equitable relief.  The district court, 
however, . . . impermissibly extended 
abstention to a common law action. 
Id. 
 A decade later, we broadened the scope of Burford 
abstention in Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home 
Assur. Co., 864 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1988).  In that case, an 
asbestos manufacturer sued its insurer for a declaratory judgment 
rather than money damages.  The insurer, as here, was in state 
rehabilitation proceedings.  We noted that Burford relied on the 
traditional discretion of a federal equity court to enforce or 
  
protect legal rights, stating the issue as "whether Burford 
abstention is appropriate in a case . . . where the court is not 
being asked to provide equitable relief."  Id. at 1044.  We held 
that abstention was available in the limited context of 
declaratory relief, opining:  
 [T]he central concern animating the Court's 
decision to abstain in Burford -- preventing 
the state regulatory scheme from needless 
disruption -- simply does not depend on 
whether the relief sought by the plaintiff is 
properly characterized as legal or equitable.  
If the relief sought is legal and the 
disruption is of the extent and character 
suggesting that Burford abstention is 
appropriate, a refusal to abstain simply 
because the federal court is not sitting in 
equity makes no sense. 
Id.  Notwithstanding this broad dictum, however, we concluded 
"that Burford abstention is appropriate in cases seeking 
declaratory relief, even though such relief does not fall within 
the traditional boundaries of equity jurisdiction."  Id. at 1045.  
In a footnote, we specifically noted that, because declaratory 
relief was created by a 1934 act of Congress, it was not a common 
law action and our holding did not conflict with Baltimore Bank.   
Id. at 1045 n.14. 
 The next year, the Supreme Court decided New Orleans 
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans ("NOPSI"), 491 U.S. 
350, 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989).  Although the Court did not decide 
the issue of whether Burford abstention is available in non-
equitable actions, it did state in dictum that "[w]here timely 
and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court 
  
sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings 
or orders of state administrative agencies . . . ."  Id. at 361, 
109 S. Ct. at 2514 (emphasis added).17  Thus, while NOPSI is 
certainly not dispositive, it lends no support whatsoever to the 
proposition that Burford abstention should be available in cases 
where the relief sought is money damages. 
 This court reviewed the issue of Burford abstention in 
legal actions in University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 
923 F.2d 265, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1991).  There, a federal class 
action was filed against the independent auditors of a failed 
insurer in rehabilitation proceedings.  The suit alleged that the 
auditors had made false and misleading statements about the 
insurer's financial condition, as a result plaintiffs bought 
insurance policies that later turned out to be no good.  We 
relied on both NOPSI and Baltimore Bank and reiterated our 
earlier holding that Burford abstention is simply not available 
in a case where the plaintiff seeks only monetary damages.  Id. 
at 271-72.  We stated: 
 [T]he Supreme Court [in NOPSI] stated, 
admittedly in dictum, that Burford abstention 
applies to a federal court sitting in equity.  
Without reading too much into this dictum, we 
believe . . . that NOPSI generally cautions 
lower federal courts not to extend Burford 
abstention beyond proper bounds.  Here, 
unlike Burford and the other Supreme Court 
                     
17
.  Based on the above dictum, the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit has held that post-NOPSI Burford abstention is very 
narrow and is not available in legal actions.  See Fragoso v. 
Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1993). 
  
cases involving Burford doctrine, the action 
was at law, not in equity, and sought 
monetary damages. 
Id. at 271 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).  The 
opinion then dealt with the insurance commissioner's argument 
that Lac D'Amiante had eliminated the limitation of Burford 
abstention to equitable actions: 
 [Lac D'Amiante], however, predated NOPSI, and 
the Supreme Court in NOPSI has given no 
indication that the distinction between legal 
and equitable relief has been diluted.  
Furthermore, all that [Lac D'Amiante] holds 
is that Burford may be extended to cases 
seeking declaratory relief -- which is in 
many ways similar to injunctive relief -- not 
that it may be extended to cases for monetary 
damages. . . .  [Lac D'Amiante] did not alter 
the principle established in Baltimore Bank.8 
 
 8Indeed, under our Internal Operating 
Procedures, the [Lac D'Amiante] panel could 
not have overruled the holding of a prior 
published opinion in this Circuit. 
Id. at 272 & n.8 (citation omitted). 
 Thus, as of 1991, the law in this circuit was clear: 
Burford abstention was only available where equitable or 
declaratory relief was sought.  Abstention in legal actions was 
barred by Baltimore Bank and University of Maryland. 
 In General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Medical 
Foundation, 973 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1992), however, a panel of this 
court reached the opposite conclusion.  Relying on what it 
perceived to be inconclusive authority, the General Glass panel 
  
refused to rule out abstention merely because the relief sought 
consisted of monetary damages.  Id. at 202. 
 I think General Glass was incorrectly decided, 
containing two analytical errors.  First, the panel relied on the 
dictum in Lac D'Amiante which indicated that "the distinction 
between legal and equitable relief is not dispositive in 
abstention cases," id., but did not cite or discuss the clear 
holding of Baltimore Bank that forbids abstention when money 
damages are sought.18  Second, it relied on Tafflin v. Levitt, 
493 U.S. 455, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990), in which the Supreme Court 
affirmed a district court judgment applying Burford abstention in 
a RICO action seeking money damages.  Notably, however, the 
Court's grant of certiorari in that case was limited solely to 
whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO 
claims.  Id. at 458, 110 S. Ct. at 794.  Tafflin therefore had no 
precedential value on the issue before the General Glass panel.  
Thus, because the binding decisional law never was inconclusive 
in the first place, the General Glass panel's reluctance to apply 
the clear holdings of Baltimore Bank and University of Maryland 
was not justified. 
 In any event,  
 Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 sets forth 
our judicial tradition that no panel of this 
court may overrule the published holding of a 
                     
18
.  The opinion did mention University of Maryland, but only in 
a "but see" citation, without any analysis, in which it opined 
that the University of Maryland court only "intimat[ed]" that 
Burford abstention is unavailable in legal actions.  Id. 
  
previous panel.  Only the in banc court may 
do that.  To the extent that the decision of 
a later panel conflicts with existing circuit 
precedent, we are bound by the earlier, not 
the later, decision. 
United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 803 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Accordingly, because General Glass flatly conflicts with both 
Baltimore Bank and University of Maryland, neither of which have 
been overruled,  I am respectfully forced to conclude that 
General Glass was wrongly decided and never was the law of this 
circuit.   
 Applying Baltimore Bank and University of Maryland to 
this case, it is clear that Burford abstention is not available.  
Although the complaint does plead rescission, admittedly an 
equitable remedy, the plaintiffs have not sued the only party 
capable of giving rescission: Mutual Benefit itself.  Instead, 
they have sued only the individual officers and directors, who, 
if found liable, can respond only in damages.  I take no delight 
in this conclusion.  Although the abstention doctrines have their 
root in equity cases, I am aware of no reason why abstention 
should not equally be available where monetary damages are 
sought.  See Lac D'Amiante, 864 F.2d at 1044.  As one leading 
treatise puts the matter: 
 Considerations of federalism are at the heart 
of abstention.  These considerations are too 
important to be made dependent on ancient 
distinctions about the powers of the several 
courts at Westminster Hall, and the ability 
of a federal court to defer to a state in a 
proper case ought not depend on whether the 
case is thought of as "legal" or "equitable." 
  
17A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 
4241, at 17-18 (1988). 
 Delightful or not, however, our circuit's law is clear, 
and until and unless the in banc court or the Supreme Court 
overrules Baltimore Bank, we remain bound by it. 
